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Abstract 
This article discusses the relationship between monetary policy and oil prices and, in a 
broader sense, commodity prices. Firstly, it focuses on describing the relationship between 
key macroeconomic variables, gas prices and other commodity prices relative to oil prices. 
Subsequently, it discusses the existence of “transmission channels” through which monetary 
policy can be propagated to oil prices (or prices of commodities). It then provides an insight 
into the CNB’s forecasting process, both by looking retrospectively at the oil price outlook in 
the past and by analysing a transitory and a permanent shock (a rise in the oil price of USD 
30/b). The simulated oil price shock is calculated from the average level of Brent oil prices in 
the first quarter of 2010, i.e. USD 77.50/b.  
Key words: oil price, monetary policy, real interest rate, oil price shock.  
JEL Classification: G12, G14, D53. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The current debate among central banks is increasingly focused on the role of asset prices in 
the process of monetary policy decision-making and maintaining financial stability. However, 
most small open economies have their attention fixed not only on financial market 
developments (stock and bond prices and exchange rates) and property prices, but also on 
commodity prices, in particular prices of oil and oil products. The primary motivation for 
writing this article was to provide a comprehensive view of the significant role which oil has 
played, and still plays, in the global economic system. We will also try to quantify the threat 
posed to the Czech economy by a potential medium-strong oil price shock.  
The relationship between monetary policy and oil prices is not a frequently addressed topic in 
the economic literature, especially focusing on small open economies. This is especially true 
as regards analysis of the Czech economy. In this paper
1
 we are focusing to evaluate the 
sensitivity of the Czech economy and monetary policy to a potential oil price shock.  
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of oil and oil product 
prices and their relation to key macroeconomic variables and prices of other commodities 
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(particularly gas). Section 3 discusses the relationship between monetary policy and oil prices 
in the context of selecting optimal oil extraction volumes (producers) and corresponding 
inventory levels (oil refiners) and the effect of financial speculation (investors). Section 4 first 
defines the optimal central bank response to oil prices, then shows retrospectively which 
prices have entered the CNB’s forecasting process and provides results of a simulated positive 
transient and permanent oil price shock (a rise in the oil price of USD 30/b). The final section 
summarises and offers recommendations.  
2. KEY EMPIRICAL FACTS 
2.1  Oil and oil products 
Oil product prices are derived primarily from oil prices, hence the two are closely correlated. 
However, prices of individual oil products also depend significantly on immediate demand 
(e.g. in relation to the business cycle
2
) and have greater seasonality than oil prices. 
Technology can be modified (and therefore the ratios of individual distillates can be adjusted) 
in line with changes in the demand structure, but this is not a short-term matter. The 
proportions of the distillates differ according to the type of oil and refining techniques used. 
Table 1 summarises the approximate yields of the final products obtained from oil.  
Table 1 
Product yields during oil refining (in %)  
Fraction Proportion  Product Use 
Gases 10% 
methane, ethane  heating, cooking  
propane, butane chem. industry, fuels, heating  
Light 
distillates 
35% 
light petrol petrochemical industry 
heavy petrol motor fuels 
Middle 
distillates 
35% 
kerosene aircraft fuel 
diesel motor fuel (diesel) 
light fuel oil household heating  
Residual 
heavy 
distillates 
20% 
heavy fuel oil fuel for power plants and ships 
asphalt roads, construction 
petroleum coke steel production 
sulphur chemical industry 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IEA data. 
Total proved global oil reserves amounted to 1.26 trillion barrels at the end of 2008 (see 
Chart 1). The largest part of the global reserves is located in the Middle East. While reserves 
in North America have been showing a downward trend since the late 1980s, reserves in 
Africa, Europe and Eurasia, and South and Central America are gradually rising, thanks 
mainly to the discovery of new deposits.  
Chart 2 provides data on global oil production. The Middle East, with 26.2 million b/d, 
accounts for the largest share of the total oil extraction (84.9 million b/d in 2008). Second is 
Europe with 17.6 million b/d and third is North America, whose share of production is 
gradually declining but is still a significant 13.1 million b/d. Production in the Middle East is 
controlled by the OPEC oil cartel (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries). 
OPEC coordinates the output of its member countries
3
 (by means of quotas) to achieve the 
desired market price. OPEC’s members currently control 75% of all global oil reserves and 
account for one-third of all global oil production and a full half of global oil exports.  
                                                          
2
 For example, the share of freight transport and the consumption of diesel relative to petrol increase with growth 
in the global economy. Growth in oil prices relative to petrol prices is subsequently observed.  
3
 Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates 
and Venezuela. Indonesia terminated its membership in 2008, whereas Bolivia, Sudan, Syria and Brazil are 
considering joining. The organisation has its headquarters in Vienna.  
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Chart 1 
Proved global oil reserves (in billion barrels) 
Chart 2 
Global oil production (in million b/d) 
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Note: End-2008 data. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on British Petroleum Statistical Review and Bloomberg data. 
Global oil consumption is constantly rising (84.5 million b/d at the end of 2008). The Asia-
Pacific region dominates in terms of both level and rate of growth, with average consumption 
of around 26 million b/d (see Chart 3). North America and Europe also have significant shares 
(23.7 million and 20 million b/d respectively). The Middle East currently has “negligible” 
consumption of around 6 million b/d.  
Chart 3 
Global oil consumption (in million b/d) 
Chart 4 
Growth rate of oil consumption (%) 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
North America Central and South America
Europe, Eurasia Africa
Middle East Asia, Pacific
 
0
150
300
450
600
750
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
North America central south america
europe Middle East
africa asia, pacific
;
 
Note: Chart 3: end-2008 data; Chart 4: in %; 1965=100, global level depicted by dotted line. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on British Petroleum Statistical Review and Bloomberg data. 
Chart 4 illustrates oil consumption growth in the individual regions in relation to 1965. The 
Asia-Pacific region shows the biggest rise (almost 700%). Other significant increases (but at 
much lower levels) are recorded by the Middle East (570%) and Africa (450%). Consumption 
in North America and Europe has increased relatively little in the last 43 years (by 83% and 
70% respectively). All this can be explained by rapid economic growth in regions which were 
originally underdeveloped and are now converging, whereas Europe and North America
4
, by 
contrast, have “learnt” from oil price shocks and have started to scale down their energy use. 
                                                          
4
 The 1965 base year may have distorted the results, as both these regions were then at the peak of the business 
cycle.  
  4 
The transfer of a large amount of production from advanced regions to emerging countries has 
also played a “distorting” role, as most of this production is highly energy intensive.  
2.2 Oil price and key macroeconomic variables 
Chart 5a shows the long-term evolution of the nominal and U.S.-CPI deflated real oil price.
5
 
The real oil price at the time of the “first” and “second” oil price shocks was not surpassed 
until the beginning of 2005. Chart 5b illustrates the generally inverse relationship between the 
USD real effective exchange rate and the oil price (in USD/b).  
Chart 5 
Nominal and real variables and the price of oil  
a) nominal and real oil price (in USD/b)  b) real oil price and USD real effective exchange rate  
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters data. 
Chart 6 illustrates the relationship between oil prices and key macroeconomic variables. Oil 
prices and CPI inflation
6
 in advanced (G7) countries show a clear dependence (Chart 6a) –            
a change in the oil price passes through to inflation almost immediately. Chart 6b illustrates 
signs of an inversion relationship between oil prices and economic growth over most of the 
period under review. This mismatch is partly due to the slower adjustment of oil prices to 
changes in the phase of the business cycle.  
Chart 6 
Relationship between oil prices and macroeconomic variables of advanced countries (G7 
average) 
a) real oil price and CPI inflation  a) real oil price and economic growth  
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 The U.S.-PPI results were almost identical.  
6
 Similar results were obtained when PPI inflation was used.  
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Chart 7 shows the relationship between real oil prices and the real interest rate. Its logic is 
explained by the Hotelling model, in which oil owners decide on the basis of the real interest 
rate whether to extract oil and sell it or not to extract it and leave it in the ground. If the oil 
price is rising so fast that oil in the ground guarantees higher yields than the money obtained 
by selling it, the owners will prefer to leave it in the ground – they will postpone production 
in an effort to achieve higher prices in future. This reduces current supply and increases 
current prices while increasing future demand and reducing future prices. In a world of certain 
proprietary rights and perfect information this continues until the estimated price of oil 
adjusted for extraction costs is rising at a rate equal to the market interest rate. If interest rates 
fall, other things being equal, an impulse to slow down current oil extraction and achieve 
higher prices will arise. This should generate a negative correlation between interest rates and 
oil prices. If we put together the rapid demand growth and low real interest rates seen in 
recent years, then rapid growth in oil prices is a logical result of the Hotelling model.  
 
Chart 7 
Empirical relationship between real oil prices and real interest rates (Hotelling model) 
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Note: Hotelling relationship assumes negative correlation between interest rates (right-hand scale) and real oil 
prices.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters data. 
 
2.3 Oil and gas 
While the oil price is determined on the global market, gas markets currently tend to be 
segmented into regions with only weak correlations between markets. In the U.S. market, 
most deliveries are governed by the current (exchange) price of gas, which reflects the price 
of WTI oil with virtually no lag. In (continental) Europe the situation is different. Most 
(pipeline) deliveries are currently traded on the basis of long-term contracts whose prices are 
derived from the oil price. Only a small proportion of trades are executed at (less predictable) 
exchange prices. Numerous, often contradictory mechanisms play a role here. On the demand 
side, these include oil and gas substitutes. Increased demand for oil causes oil prices to rise 
and so demand for gas increases. This, in turn, causes the gas price to rise. This mechanism 
therefore fosters greater correlation between oil and gas prices. On the supply side, however, 
both commodities are (partial) complements. Therefore, greater oil extraction means 
increased gas production (in some oil fields). Given constant demand for gas, this can result 
in a fall in the gas price. Gas consumption shows not only strong seasonality, but also 
significant dependence on the weather, for example. Limited reserve capacity causes “peaks” 
to arise, resulting in short-term gas prices being highly volatile. The rapid development of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) technology is making shipping easier, so some convergence of oil 
and gas prices on the supply side, along with global convergence of gas prices, can be 
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expected in the future. Besides investment in LNG infrastructure, large amounts have recently 
been invested in pipeline transport and unconventional gas extraction (from shale and sand). 
As a result, there is currently a global gas surplus and customers are trying to switch from 
long-term contracts indexed to oil prices to market prices. The price of gas
7
 on the Czech 
market is currently determined mainly by long-term contracts. The exact parameters of the 
price-setting mechanism
8
 for such contracts are not publicly available. However, we have 
found the moving average of prices of oil (both Ural and Brent) over the last twelve months to 
be highly successful in explaining gas prices in the Czech Republic. This tallies with the 
observation that on the Czech market gas prices follow oil prices with a lag of roughly six 
months on average. We use this dependence in our forecasting mechanism. From the point of 
view of retail prices, this six-month lag implies that the overall impact of energy prices is 
spread over a longer period, is slower and has a smaller absolute amplitude. 
2.4 Oil and other commodities 
Most commodity prices tend to move in the same direction as oil prices. This is confirmed by 
Table 2, which gives the correlation coefficients between average annual prices of oil and 
selected commodities since 1960. It can be seen that prices of iron ore and coal show the 
highest correlation with oil prices. Except for rice prices, though, all the other commodities 
have high correlation coefficients (> 0.8). However, if we examine the evolution of the 
correlation coefficients over time (between the annual averages for a five-year rolling period 
– data and charts available on request), we find that since 1960 they have been highly volatile 
and have differed across commodities. Since 2003, however, when the oil price started rising 
constantly, the correlation coefficients have been high. This means that the other commodity 
markets have also been recording steady price growth. Even so, we cannot say that oil has 
been affecting the other commodities or vice versa. None of the price time series for any of 
these commodities is stationary – not even after first differentiation in the case of coal and 
iron ore. Analysis of the potential dependence of individual commodity prices on oil prices 
(or vice versa) therefore requires cointegration tests. These, however, reveal no cointegration 
(and hence no long-term relationship), except for the oil-nickel pair. Therefore, we can say 
that (most) price co-movements of oil and the commodities under observation are a result of 
co-dependence on some other variable. The candidates include, for example, U.S./Fed 
monetary policy (see below) or the global economic cycle. These increase or decrease the 
demand (actual or speculative) for all commodities, which, given more or less imperfect 
competition on the supply side, leads to commodity price volatility. Owing to differing 
dynamics and the lag of commodity prices behind the business cycle, we therefore observe a 
dependence (albeit only apparent) between individual commodity prices and the oil price, 
which is expressed in Table 2 by means of Granger causality.
9
 
                                                          
7
 Here we mean the wholesale price of gas. The data source is the IMF statistics on Russian gas prices at the 
German border. New figures are usually available only on a quarterly basis. Retail prices are still regulated in the 
Czech Republic, but largely reflect wholesale prices. 
8
 RWE says that in setting the price of natural gas for wholesale customers it takes into account the prices of 
light and heavy fuel oil and black (and steam) coal (i.e. prices relatively closely related to oil prices) as well as 
Pribor and Libor interest rates and the EUR/USD exchange rate. 
9
 Granger causality does not necessarily mean that an actual causal dependence exists between two variables (in 
our case the oil price and the selected commodity price). It is a statistical concept which asks whether past values 
of X make a statistically significant contribution to explaining the evolution of Y, even when we also use past 
values of Y for the explanation. If yes, we say that X Granger-causes Y. Table 2 shows the probability of the null 
hypothesis, i.e. that X does not cause Y. The smaller is the probability, the more statistically significant is the 
Granger causality from X to Y.  
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Table 2 
Relationship between the oil price and other commodity prices 
Commodity 
Correlation of 
commodity price  
with oil price 
Granger causality  
from oil prices to 
commodity prices 
from commodity 
prices to oil prices 
coal 0.904 0.001 * 0.001 * 
aluminium 0.803 0.836   0.095   
copper 0.877 0.349   0.015 * 
iron ore 0.941 0.100   0.003 * 
nickel 0.830 0.011 * 0.000 * 
wheat 0.858 0.031 * 0.232   
rice 0.669 0.046 * 0.214   
corn 0.802 0.044 * 0.258   
gold 0.886 0.001 * 0.644   
silver 0.819 0.010 * 0.294   
Note: Granger causality test results statistically significant at the 5% level are indicated by *. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters data. 
It can be seen from the analysis that there is statistically significant bi-directional Granger 
causality between oil prices and coal and nickel prices. The causality from prices of other 
industrial metals to oil prices (and not vice versa) is also significant. Conversely, we observe 
a causality running from oil prices to prices of agricultural commodities and precious metals 
(and not vice versa). To obtain a more precise description of the dynamics we would have to 
specify a more sophisticated model. Nonetheless, based on our results we can state that an 
economic upswing is reflected first in rising prices of industrial metals, then in rising prices of 
energy, and finally in rising prices of agricultural commodities and precious metals (by this 
time possibly due to inflation or rising inflation expectations).  
2.5 Oil price and the USD exchange rate 
There is traditionally a negative correlation between the dollar exchange rate and oil prices, 
although the relationship between the two has undergone major changes in the past (see 
Chart 8). Breitenfellner and Cuaresma (2008) divide the relationship from 1950 to the present 
into roughly four periods according to the volatility of, and correlation between, the two 
variables. These periods coincide with regime shifts in oil and money markets. 
The first period (1950–1970) was characterised by low oil price volatility and a strong 
negative correlation (-0.62). The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was in place. 
Other characteristics included low inflation, low interest rates and high economic growth. Oil 
prices were controlled by seven large international corporations that dominated oil 
production, refinement and distribution.  
The following period between 1971 and 1984 was one of high volatility and the negative 
correlation was not so strong (-0.18).
10
 In August 1971, President Nixon announced the 
discontinuation of gold convertibility of the U.S. dollar given the deteriorating U.S. balance 
of payments. This move resulted in a steep depreciation of the dollar against gold and other 
world currencies. OPEC, whose purchasing power had decreased, was slow to react to the 
dollar’s depreciation. Only two years later, during the Yom Kippur War (October 1973), 
OPEC cut its oil production and placed an embargo on oil exports to the West. The price of 
oil quadrupled in a year, while the dollar continued to depreciate. The next oil crisis started in 
autumn 1978 in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, which led to a temporary fall in oil 
production in the country. The subsequent growth in oil prices was boosted by a phased 
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 The different correlation figure (-0.97) from our calculations for the period may be due to the use of different 
methods for calculating the EUR/USD exchange rate before 1999.  
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decontrol of oil prices by the Carter administration. The price of oil again quadrupled in a 
year. At the end of the second period (1981–1984) the dollar regained strength sharply as a 
result of restrictive Fed monetary policy (under chairman Paul Volcker) and the price of oil 
fell slightly despite a decrease in oil supply due to the Iraq–Iran conflict. The strengthening 
dollar and economic recession in the USA probably played a stronger role. 
In the third period (1985–1998) both the dollar exchange rate and the oil price were less 
volatile. The correlation was no longer negative (+0.44). OPEC lost its power to set prices 
when Saudi Arabia almost doubled its production in August 1985. This was followed by a fall 
in oil prices. Throughout the period OPEC was unable to take effective action to raise them. 
In September 1985, the Plaza Accord was signed in the United States with the aim of 
devaluing the dollar. This was intended to reduce the current account deficit and help the 
country emerge from recession. Over the following two years, coordinated central bank 
intervention caused a depreciation of the dollar by more than 50%. The price of oil surged 
temporarily in August 1990 as a consequence of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait but 
subsequent declined almost uninterruptedly. This is put into context with transition-induced 
recession in the former Soviet Union and in Central Europe. Oil prices reached their deepest 
level as a result of the Asian crisis (1997–1998). 
The last period (since 1999) is marked by high volatility and a renewed strong negative 
correlation (-0.80). Owing to low investment in the previous periods, oil producers were 
unable to keep pace with rising oil consumption due to rapid growth in demand in emerging 
(Asian) economies. Reserve extraction capacity decreased and oil prices started to rise 
dramatically. As non-OPEC production was already beyond its peak, the oil cartel’s price-
setting power increased. Fundamentals, geopolitical risks and excess liquidity resulting from 
easy monetary policy caused an inflow of speculative money into the oil market. This, in turn, 
bolstered the growth in oil prices and caused a speculative bubble to form. This bubble burst 
in July 2008 and the oil price temporarily collapsed. However, thanks to the renewed market 
power of OPEC, the price very soon returned to the level which OPEC considers favourable 
for both oil producers (in terms of investment efficiency) and consumers.  
Chart 8 
Empirical relationship between the EUR/USD exchange rate and oil prices 
a) EUR/USD exchange rate and oil price  b) Moving correlation coefficient of EUR/USD 
exchange rate and oil price (period = 5 years) 
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Source: Calculated using Thomson Reuters and IMF-IFS data.  
The negative correlation between the USD exchange rate and the oil price for most of this 
period is no accident and can be attributed to five channels (see Breitenfellner and Cuaresma, 
2008): (i) The purchasing power of oil export revenues on the supply side – oil exporters aim 
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to stabilise the purchasing power of their (U.S. dollar) export revenues in a situation where 
their imports are mostly paid for in euro. A condition for this channel to function is that oil-
exporting countries must – at least partially – have the power to affect oil prices by altering 
supply. In fact, OPEC’s power was highly volatile in the past, but with soaring demand from 
China and other emerging economies and with production having peaked in most non-OPEC 
countries, OPEC’s significance has recently increased considerably. (ii) Local prices in non-
dollar regions on the demand side – the dollar’s depreciation reduces oil prices in countries 
whose currencies have strengthened against the dollar, thereby increasing demand for oil and 
the oil price denominated in dollars. (iii) Investment in oil-related markets – the dollar’s 
depreciation reduces foreign investors’ returns on U.S. dollar-denominated financial assets, 
hence increasing the attractiveness of oil and other commodities as an alternative investment 
for foreign investors. Investment in commodities is also used by U.S. investors to hedge 
against domestic inflation, the risk of which increases as the dollar depreciates. (iv) Monetary 
policy and exchange rate regimes – the dollar’s depreciation entails an easing of monetary 
policy conditions in countries whose currencies are pegged to the dollar (including oil 
exporters and China). In turn, demand – including demand for oil products – rises in those 
countries.
11
 In such case, however, this may involve only an apparent correlation, with the 
USD/EUR exchange rate and the price of oil in fact being co-determined by a third variable, 
namely the real interest rate (if the uncovered interest parity applies). (v) Efficient currency 
markets – currency markets are possibly more efficient than oil market and hence anticipate 
developments in the real economy that affect the demand for and supply of oil.  
The above-mentioned channels assume that the causality goes from the dollar exchange rate 
to the oil price. This is contradicted by a number of studies which also admit the opposite 
direction of causality, i.e. from the oil price to the dollar exchange rate, and particularly to the 
exchange rates of “commodity currencies” (the currencies of major global commodity-
exporting countries). In the empirical part of their study, Breitenfellner and Cuaresma (2008) 
find that the direction of causality is unclear, but they also come to a relatively strong 
conclusion that the inclusion of the EUR/USD exchange rate among a model’s explanatory 
variables improves its ability to predict future oil prices.  
3. LINKS BETWEEN MONETARY POLICY AND THE PRICE OF OIL 
(COMMODITIES)  
The accelerating growth in the prices of oil and other commodities which can be observed 
since 2003 is causing many to ask what is causing this growth. The sustained economic boom 
in Asia, growing demand in emerging economies, political instability (Venezuela and Nigeria; 
unrest in the Middle East), gradually depleting reserves of oil (commodities) and rising 
extraction costs are usually cited as the main reasons. However, this hypothesis is 
contradicted by developments over the last three years. The world economy started to slide 
into recession in late 2007. This situation was aggravated by the fall of Lehman Brothers on 
15 September 2008 and by the onset of the global financial crisis. Meanwhile, however, the 
price of oil surged by almost 100% starting in late 2007. Almost all mineral and agricultural 
commodities then recorded rising prices. A strong correction of oil and other commodity 
prices occurred only in the second half of 2008. Since 2009, commodity prices have been 
rising sharply again. The question is what is causing these contradictory trends of strongly 
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 Anchoring oil exporters’ currencies to the U.S. dollar is criticised from the perspective of global trade 
imbalances (oil exporters’ current account surpluses largely correspond to the U.S. current account deficit). It is 
not certain, however, that higher consumption in oil-exporting countries would reduce the U.S. deficit, as these 
countries import primarily from Europe and Asia. By contrast, higher imports could increase oil consumption in 
Europe, where oil price growth has not been so dramatic in the past thanks to appreciation of the euro. Further 
dollar oil price growth would lead, in turn, to a further deterioration in the U.S. current account deficit. 
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rising commodity prices and an economy sliding into recession. Are demand and supply 
factors tied to economic growth a sufficient reason for the surge in commodity prices? If 
global economic growth since 2002 does not explain this surge, where should we look for its 
causes? 
One group of economists
12
 believes that the recent dramatic rise in commodity prices could 
not have been caused solely by supply and demand for commodities including oil (as assumed 
by the traditional hypothesis), but that it was due largely to “cheap money”. A possible 
explanation can therefore be found in how monetary policy has been conducted, or rather in 
the real interest rate level, which is a very important factor underlying real commodity prices. 
Chart 9 
Real commodity prices at times of high and low real interest rates 
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Source: Calculated using Bloomberg data. 
Chart 9 describes the relationship between real (CPI deflated) interest rates in the USA and 
the Commodity Research Bureau Index
13
 in real terms. Commodity prices have been low at 
times of relatively high interest rates, i.e. tighter Fed monetary policy (shown in blue), and 
high at times of relatively low rates. This would suggest that interest rates have a greater 
impact on prices of oil and other commodities than generally assumed so far. 
The current high commodity prices may therefore be a result of the Fed’s long-running easy 
monetary policy, which started in 2001.
14
 A second wave of aggressive cuts started in October 
2007. The Fed lowered its key policy rate from 4.75% to only 0.25% at the end of 2008, i.e. 
over a period of just 14 months. On the one hand, this was a logical consequence of the 
situation facing the U.S. economy (i.e. the technology bubble, the terrorist attacks of 2001, the 
economic downturn, etc.). On the other hand the sustained easy monetary policy probably led 
to overall growth in asset prices, including commodity prices. Chart 10 shows the dynamic 
growth of real prices of individual commodity categories (i.e. industrial metals and 
agricultural commodities as well as the overall commodity basket), Brent crude oil prices and 
U.S. real interest rates. In the period of rising rates (i.e. the 1980s and 1990s), commodity 
prices did not record such high growth as after 2000, when interest rates were falling sharply. 
                                                          
12
 See, for example, Frankel (2006). 
13
 The CBR Index describes the overall direction in commodity prices. It is a measure of price movements of 19 
basic commodities. The greatest weight is assigned to oil (23%), followed by copper, corn, gold, live cattle, 
soybeans and natural gas (6%), cocoa, coffee, cotton, heating oil, unleaded petrol and sugar (5%) and nickel, 
orange juice, silver, wheat and pork (1%).  
14
 The key interest rate was gradually lowered from 6.50% on 3 January 2001 to 1.00% on 25 June 2003. 
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The different trends in the two periods are most visible in prices of agricultural commodities 
(non-storable, perishable) and mineral commodities (storable), i.e. oil and industrial metals.  
Chart 10 
Real commodity prices and real interest rates (index, 1983 Q1 = 100) 
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Source: Calculated using Bloomberg data. 
For example, Frankel (2006) states that the effect of real interest rates on the supply of, and 
demand for, storable commodities can be transmitted through these channels: (i) production, 
(ii) inventories and (iii) financial speculation. 
3.1 Production 
When interest rates are low, producers leave oil in the ground instead of extracting it and 
storing it in tanks (see the Hotelling model, section 2.2). In this case it is virtually impossible 
for excess supply of storable commodities (oil, natural gas, metals) to amass. Prices then rise 
as new oil deliveries fail to keep pace with growth in global demand. This would mean that 
some cases of apparent stagnation in oil deliveries as a result of low capacity are merely an 
illusion – oil producers are able to keep up with rising demand, but low interest rates 
encourage them to keep more unextracted oil in the ground, thereby creating an impression of 
stagnating oil supply.
15
 
3.2 Inventories 
Low real interest rates lead to expectations of rising oil prices in the future. That prompts oil 
producers to increase their oil inventories, as stored oil can be sold at a higher price later on. 
Hence, the motivation of companies to transport their inventories to the distribution network 
weakens, while demand for storable commodities increases. Oil inventories are therefore held 
in tanks and the decision on how much oil to sell involves weighing the interest rate level 
against expected future growth in prices. If the rate of return on financial assets is 
extraordinarily low, it is better to keep oil in tanks than to sell it today and reinvest the 
proceeds.  
3.3 Financial speculation 
Low interest rates encourage speculators to shift their investment interests (capital) out of 
relatively risk-free short-term interest-bearing financial instruments (e.g. Treasury bills) to 
very risky commodity contracts, which on the other hand can generate higher returns. 
Therefore, rational investors (i.e. small investors, banks, pension funds and hedge funds) 
                                                          
15
 This also applies to other storable and non-perishable commodities, i.e. how much copper to mine, how much 
of a forest to log, etc. 
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seeking higher returns in an environment of low interest rates – even if that means taking on a 
higher degree of risk – are a key factor of speculative growth in commodity prices.  
All these three mechanisms can therefore foster growth in real commodity prices. The 
theoretical model can be summarised as follows: expansionary monetary policy temporarily 
lowers real interest rates (whether via a fall in nominal rates or a rise in expected inflation). 
This stimulates growth in commodity prices in real terms. Commodity prices can then rise 
until they are widely considered “overvalued”. In that situation, there is a prevailing 
expectation of a future decline in prices (and other costs, i.e. storage costs, transaction costs, 
the risk premium, etc.) that is sufficient to offset the low interest rates (and other benefits of 
carrying inventories – the “convenience yield”16). If we imagine the logic underlying, for 
example, the theory of exchange rate overshooting (see Dornbusch, 1976) and we replace the 
exchange rate with the price of commodities, then in the long run – when the price level 
adjusts to the change in money supply – the real interest rate and real commodity price should 
return to their initial levels. 
4.  PRICES OF OIL (COMMODITIES) IN THE CNB’S FORECASTING PROCESS 
4.1 How should a central bank react to an oil price shock?  
There is a clear consensus across the economic literature that central banks should closely 
monitor and analyse developments in asset markets (including oil and other commodity 
markets).
17
 However, in the case of oil prices (as opposed to, say, stock or property prices), 
the debate is more or less limited to their impact on the CPI, and especially the extent to 
which these supply shocks should be exempted. The experience of recent years suggests that 
making exemptions, or targeting core inflation, may be a mistake, as commodity price growth 
forms part of the contrary movements in relative prices and moreover reflects monetary 
policy settings (i.e. it is not a classic exemptible exogenous shock).  
Growth in oil prices – or the second-round effects of such growth on inflation – should lead, 
ceteris paribus, to an increase in the central bank’s rates. It is a negative supply shock. If 
demand remained unchanged, inflation would have to rise at least temporarily. There are two 
fundamental problems here. First, we do not usually know whether the shock is permanent or 
transitory. Transitory shocks (especially those stemming from global demand) can cause input 
prices to rise, but their effect on consumer prices (higher prices of fuels, food, etc.) is smaller. 
If the shock is considered transitory, the central bank’s optimal reaction could be to raise real 
interest rates slightly in order to moderate demand. If the shock is permanent, it lowers the 
economy’s potential and, ceteris paribus, real interest rates should also rise. However, if 
expectations of a permanent decline in productivity reduce permanent income, consumption 
will fall, followed by investment. Ultimately, even temporarily reducing real interest rates in 
an effort to prevent an excessive drop in demand may be the optimal monetary policy 
reaction. The reduction can be temporary because net investment should return to its original 
level after some time (at a lower absolute level of capital). If we add the intertemporal aspect 
to the equation, the situation becomes even more complicated. A temporary reduction of real 
interest rates would shift part of demand from the future to the present, thereby only 
postponing the problems or requiring an even larger reduction of real interest rates in the 
future. Overall, it is apparent that the optimal monetary policy reaction to an oil price shock is 
hard to define within the prevailing theory, partly because a significant part of the shock may 
be endogenous rather than exogenous.  
                                                          
16
 The benefit or yield associated with physically holding a commodity rather than holding a derivative linked to 
the commodity.  
17
 For more details on this debate, see Posen (2006) and Roubini (2006), and for a discussion focusing on 
transition countries see Frait and Komárek (2007).  
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The second problem is that growth in prices of oil or other commodities is not an isolated 
shock, so the ceteris paribus condition does not apply. On the contrary, it takes place amid 
significant changes in the world economy and, of course, in the Czech economy as well. The 
latter is undergoing structural changes that are probably raising potential growth. This is an 
anti-inflationary phenomenon running counter to the effects of rising prices of oil and other 
commodities. In addition, other significant processes are taking place in the world economy, 
e.g. a weakening of the U.S. dollar. In small open economies (such as the Czech Republic), 
this is directly causing a decline in import prices in koruna terms, which has potential first- 
and second-round effects on inflation. Other important effects also exist. Given the positions 
of the euro and dollar in Czech exports and imports, the terms of trade will improve, 
increasing the funds available to the domestic economy. Other effects may ensue from the 
decline in koruna prices of technology imported from the dollar area. This can be regarded as 
a positive supply shock, reducing investment costs and increasing the economy’s potential. 
The depreciation of the dollar should also act indirectly via its potential impacts on European 
exports. Economists differ significantly in their assessment of the strength of this effect. 
Despite all the problems with identifying the optimal monetary policy reaction, we can show 
how monetary policy responds to oil price shocks in the CNB’s modelling system.18 
4.2 What oil price outlook enters the forecasting process? 
Since the July 2006 forecast, the CNB’s forecasting system has been using the price of Brent 
crude oil, the outlook for which is derived from futures contracts. Brent crude oil replaced the 
previously used Ural crude oil. The forecast for the price of Ural crude oil was derived from 
the WTI crude oil price forecast published regularly by the Consensus Forecasts (CF). In 
addition, since April 2006, the forecasting system has also been using fuel prices, forecasts 
for which are derived from swap contracts on (ARA: Amsterdam–Rotterdam–Antwerp) 
exchanges in north-western Europe.  
Oil and petrol prices are currently derived from futures contract quotations. These are 
determined as of the Consensus Forecasts (CF) survey date in order to ensure consistency 
with the other external indicators. The CF forecast is only available for the three-month and 
one-year horizons (meaning that developments at other time horizons have to be calculated), 
whereas futures contract quotations are available several years ahead at monthly frequency. 
The expected future evolution of oil and petrol prices calculated on the basis of such 
quotations is therefore better defined. Moreover, a CNB analysis has revealed that since 2004 
futures contracts have predicted the future WTI oil price (the only oil price indicator 
contained in CF) better than the analysts’ estimates contained in the CF survey, especially at 
the longer horizon. Simulated forecasts of the index of import prices of energy-producing 
materials based on prices of various types of oil have proved that Brent crude oil has the 
highest explanatory power. Likewise, petrol prices on the ARA exchanges are the best 
available indicator for estimating retail fuel prices at filling stations in the Czech Republic. 
Chart 11 compares the actual prices of Ural and Brent crude oils in USD/b with the individual 
forecasts entering the CNB’s forecasting process (thin black lines). As Chart 11 shows, the oil 
prices entered into the forecasting process were lower than the actual subsequent prices in the 
vast majority of cases. This confirms the hypothesis that the oil prices gathered in the CF, or 
stemming from market outlooks, are backward-looking. However, this is linked with the fact 
that prices were rising significantly over most of the period under review. It can also be seen 
that, with the exception of the recent past, the outlooks are not good at capturing either the 
direction of movement or turning points. 
                                                          
18
 However, the modelling system largely ignores the long-term impacts of oil price changes on the supply side 
of the economy; these could be incorporated using expert judgement during the preparation of the real forecast. 
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Chart 11 
Actual oil prices and their CF and market outlook paths (in USD/b) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Consensus Forecasts and Thomson Reuters data. 
4.3 Impact of an oil price shock on the external and domestic economy 
The impact of an oil price shock (i.e. a step increase of USD 30/b) was estimated for the 
Czech economy using a model
19
 (g3) in two basic variants – a transitory one-year increase 
and a permanent increase. The impact on the euro area economy, which is used here to 
demonstrate an exogenous environment, was consistently calculated by simulation of the 
NIGEM model. Tables 3 and 4 contain the expected paths of the exogenous variables, while 
Charts 12 and 13 show the g3 model outputs in the form of the path of the endogenous 
variables according to the baseline scenario and the deviation induced by the oil price shock.  
4.3.1 Transitory one-year oil price shock (+ USD 30/b) 
An oil price increase of USD 30/b was reflected fastest in a rise in external interest rates and a 
decline in external GDP (see Table 3). Except for a lag in Q1, external PPI inflation also rose 
simultaneously. The price shock faded fastest in the case of external interest rates, which after 
rising in response to the price shock fell sharply in 2011 Q1 and continued declining steadily 
thereafter. The decline in external GDP slowed in the following quarter. The slowest 
adjustment was observed for PPI inflation, which started to slow in 2011 Q3.  
Table 3 
External developments according to the NIGEM model – one-year oil price shock of USD 30/b 
 I/10 II/10 III/10 IV/10 I/11 II/11 III/11 IV/11 I/12 II/12 III/12 IV/12 
Ext. GDP  - -0.08 -0.11 -0.15 -0.22 -0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14 
Ext. PPI  - -0.16 0.13 0.36 0.54 1.03 0.66 0.28 -0.05 -0.51 -0.54 -0.48 
3M Euribor - 0.45 0.68 0.79 0.05 -0.16 -0.23 -0.25 -0.26 -0.25 -0.24 -0.22 
Note: Values express changes compared to baseline; external GDP and PPI (y-o-y in p.p.). 
Source: Simulations in NIGEM model.  
The effects of the transitory one-year oil price shock on the Czech economy are described in 
Chart 12. A transitory increase in oil prices generates higher inflation pressures (see Chart 
12a) via growth in import prices and domestic regulated energy prices. The implied domestic 
interest rate path (see Chart 12b) is thus shifted slightly upwards in order to counteract the 
expected inflationary pressures (via a decline in domestic real economic activity). GDP 
declined slightly (by 0.1 percentage point) in Q2, but returned to its initial level after a year. 
                                                          
19
 For details, see Andrle, Hlédik, Kameník and Vlček (2009). 
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The largest deviation is observed for the nominal CZK/EUR exchange rate (see Chart 12d). 
The koruna appreciates strongly against the euro in Q3, owing mainly to growth in external 
PPI inflation and also to a slight transient rise in external interest rates (which started to fall 
sharply in 2011 Q1) relative to domestic rates.  
Chart 12 
Deviation from the baseline scenario – one-year oil price shock of USD 30/b 
a) CPI inflation (y-o-y, in %) b) 3M Pribor (in %)  
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Note: Baseline scenario – solid line; deviation from baseline scenario – dashed line. 
Source: Simulations in g3 model. 
4.3.2 Permanent oil price shock (+ USD 30/b) 
For all the selected exogenous variables, the difference between the permanent and transitory 
oil price shocks is reflected mainly in a sharp deviation from the baseline scenario in 2010 
(see Table 4). The return to the baseline scenario values is then very slow in 2011. The price 
shock was again reflected fastest in external interest rates and GDP. PPI inflation again 
responded with a lag of one quarter. The GDP decline started to slow in 2011 Q2. External 
interest rates also started to fall moderately in this period. The interest rate path changed later 
than in the case of the one-year price shock, while external interest rates remained relatively 
high until the end of 2011. As in the previous variant, the price shock abates most slowly in 
the case of external PPI inflation, which does not start to decline until the start of 2011 Q3.  
Table 4 
External developments according to the NIGEM model – permanent oil price shock of USD 30/b 
 I/10 II/10 III/10 IV/10 I/11 II/11 III/11 IV/11 I/12 II/12 III/12 IV/12 
Ext. GDP  - -0.15 -0.30 -0.43 -0.57 -0.54 -0.50 -0.46 -0.41 -0.37 -0.33 -0.30 
Ext. PPI  - -0.10 0.24 0.50 0.72 1.01 0.84 0.71 0.60 0.51 0.42 0.35 
3M Euribor - 0.52 0.76 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.84 0.79 0.74 0.69 0.64 0.59 
Note: Values express changes compared to baseline; external GDP and PPI (y-o-y in p.p.). 
Source: Simulations in NIGEM model.  
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The impact of the permanent oil price shock on the endogenous variables is demonstrated in 
Chart 13. As regards CPI inflation (see Chart 13a), domestic interest rates (see Chart 13b) and 
annual real GDP growth (see Chart 13c), the observed variables followed a similar pattern as 
in the case of the transient shock, the only difference being a stronger and longer-term 
response this time. The only major change is seen for the nominal CZK/EUR rate (see Chart 
13d) – the koruna responds by depreciating for a short time and then converging towards the 
euro exchange rate. By the end of 2011, the koruna is again appreciating modestly against the 
euro. This different pattern (the koruna oscillating around the euro exchange rate) compared 
to the previous variant is due mainly to two contrary factors: higher growth and a gradual 
decline in external interest rates (depreciation of the koruna) and growth in external PPI 
inflation, which exerts appreciation pressure on the koruna. In the end, these two effects 
cancel each other out – the effect of higher external interest rates prevails in the first phase up 
to the end of 2011 and is subsequently outweighed by the effect of higher external PPI 
inflation and renewed appreciation of the koruna. 
 
Chart 13 
Deviation from the baseline scenario – permanent oil price shock of USD 30/b 
a) CPI inflation (y-o-y, in %) b) 3M Pribor (in %)  
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c) Real GDP growth (y-o-y, in %) d) Nominal CZK/EUR exchange rate  
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Note: Baseline scenario – solid line; deviation from baseline scenario – dashed line.  
Source: Simulations in g3 model. 
4.4 The oil price in the CNB’s forecasting model 
The CNB’s current model framework (g3) does not capture the direct effect of oil prices on 
the import deflator. This effect is captured only indirectly via the external PPI. This raises the 
question of whether, at times of high oil price volatility, the model is able to adequately 
capture the effect of changes in energy import prices on total import prices without the use of 
expert adjustment. For this reason, a satellite version of the model was created which 
explicitly quantifies the effect of the price of Brent crude oil on the overall forecast. In this 
version of the g3 model, the real marginal costs of the import sector, which affect the import 
deflator, are a weighted average of the external PPI and the oil price denominated in the 
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domestic currency. The share of the effect of oil prices on the real marginal costs of the 
import sector is calibrated at 5%. An assessment of predictive powers reveals that the 
extended model better predicts the endogenous model variables at times of high oil price 
volatility. It does not provide worse prediction results at times of stable oil prices. For this 
reason, the extended model is used as a satellite version of the core prediction model in 
situations of increased volatility of oil prices in world markets. 
5. SUMMARY 
The significant upward tendencies in commodity prices in recent years, which are certainly 
having a strong effect on price-setting, represent a big challenge for monetary policy. While 
the traditional economic view says that demand and supply factors are usually the key factors 
determining changes in prices of oil and other commodities, the effect of monetary policy 
cannot be disregarded in this respect. The results of our observations show that real 
commodity prices tend to decline as the interest rate rises and increase as it falls. The Fed’s 
easy monetary policy over the past 10 years has been an important aspect of the rise in 
commodity prices, i.e. real interest rates – along with other factors – are important 
determinants of real commodity prices. Speculative demand supported by low global interest 
rates “artificially” pushes prices above the level of classical market prices created by supply 
(commodity suppliers) and demand (processors). Sustained easy monetary policy in turn 
causes investors (speculators) to shift to commodities. Over time, and as financial markets 
develop (are modernised) towards providing a wide range of instruments (especially various 
types of derivatives linked to underlying assets – commodities), financial flows become more 
and more sensitive to changes in interest rates. This is why commodity prices have continued 
to show a sharp upward trend despite the recent global fall in demand. The above arguments 
therefore favour generally tighter monetary policy. Consequently, central banks should 
closely monitor commodity prices as an indicator of potential future inflation pressures.  
Our analysis also showed that the largest percentage increase in oil consumption since 1965 
has been recorded in the Asia-Pacific region (growth of almost 700%). Consumption in 
Europe, by contrast, has recorded only a modest rise. Subsequently applied Granger causality 
tests yielded results on the existence of a statistically significant causality running from prices 
of other industrial metals to oil prices (and not vice versa). By contrast, as regards agricultural 
commodities and precious metals, we observe a causality going from oil prices to prices of 
such commodities (and not vice versa). Since the end of the 1950s, a negative dependence 
between the dollar exchange rate and oil prices – in the sense of a higher oil price implying a 
weaker dollar – has usually applied. As regards the effect on retail prices in the Czech 
Republic, a relatively stable six-month lag of gas prices behind oil prices has also been 
demonstrated. This implies that the overall impact of energy prices on macroeconomic 
variables is spread over a longer period, is slower and has a smaller absolute amplitude. An 
empirical analysis conducted using the NIGEM model and the CNB’s macroeconomic model 
(g3) tells a similar story. This analysis consisted in modelling the impacts of a transient and 
permanent shock to the oil price (an increase of USD 30/b). Macroeconomic variables 
generally responded more strongly to the permanent price shock in both observed territories. 
When comparing the two scenarios, the largest change in path was observed for the nominal 
CZK/EUR exchange rate, which appreciated strongly against the euro in the case of the 
transitory oil price shock. In the case of the permanent shock, a higher level of, and gradual 
decline in, external interest rates caused a short-term depreciation of the koruna, which was 
soon replaced by a slight appreciation due to higher external PPI inflation. An increase in the 
oil price of USD 30/b therefore proved non-fatal for both the global and the Czech economy.  
  18 
As regards the evolution of oil and commodity prices going forward, risks can currently be 
identified mainly in the gradual modest recovery of the world economy and the expected 
renewed growth in demand. Another potential risk is the excess money that has been pumped 
into the world economy as part of stimulation measures introduced during the crisis. In the 
event of a late or insufficient exit from the current expansionary monetary policy, the “spare” 
funds (those not corresponding to the needs of the real economy) might be moved into oil and 
other commodities via purchases of derivatives. In such case, it would not be possible to view 
the subsequent price growth – exceeding central banks’ inflation targets – as a supply shock. 
Hence, the absence of a corresponding monetary policy reaction would not be justified, as 
monetary policy itself would be the originator of a price shock. 
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